Friday 2 November 2012

Asian-Pacific Distraction Politics: The Diaoyu Islands


Stephen Zhao

Even at the best of times relations between China and Japan have been delicate. With memories of Imperialist Japan and the Second World War strongly engrained in Chinese public consciousness, diplomatic incidents with Japan tend to create an overreaction with the Chinese public. Recently, animosity between the two states has escalated to new levels with the dispute over ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

The root of the disputes date back to 1968, when a UN report suggested that the islands may hold oil underneath them. In the 1970s, both Mainland China and Taiwan instated territorial claims towards these islands as a result of the new findings. These claims were of minor significance until 1996, when the Japanese Youth Federation repaired a lighthouse on one of the Senkaku Islands. As a result of these actions, anti-Japanese protests flared up across China. The streets were filled with protesters chanting anti-Japanese slogans and large portions of the public boycotted Japanese products. Although these protests eventually subsided, Japan and China never reached a concrete agreement regarding the ownership of the islands. The official diplomatic stance on the Islands was to agree to disagree. 



These islands now have returned to the forefront of Sino-Japanese relations following the Tokyo Municipality's decision to purchase the islands from their private owner, rendering them as official Japanese state property. Both state and private media in China reported this action as an unacceptable violation of China's sovereign rights. The inflammatory statements from every conceivable media outlet in China spurred a volatile reaction from the populace. Large swaths of angry Chinese rampaged through the streets, smashing anything Japanese – from stores to cars to consulates. As a result of the outrage, the Japanese suffered sizeable economic setbacks in the form of frozen inventories, heavy reductions in tourism, and waning market confidence in an already stagnant economy. In China, violence by protestors result in death while vandalism caused immense property damage. Across the nation, businesses and factories closed to protect themselves from unrest. 

One must wonder with all this madness:  who is right and who is wrong? The answer is no one and everyone. 

The timing of this diplomatic crisis could not be more perfect for these two countries. China is in the midst of a crucial power transition from the current Hu Jintao regime to its successors. If the public is preoccupied with Japan, they cannot disrupt the government transition with displays of disapproval or other seditious activities. Similarly, Japan is nearing an election. As economic indicators in Japan are rather lacklustre, the incumbent regime seeks to shore up support by showcasing strength in foreign policy. Escalating the Island dispute benefits both governments by directing the attention of their public spheres away from domestic affairs. However, this does not mean that this incident is a part of some insidious government scheme. 

While it may benefit the respective governments of China and Japan to take hardline stances on the issue, they only do so to appeal to the public sphere. Once the Chinese government brings attention to the island dispute through state media, applications for protests and demonstrations will flood in on their own accord. With September 18th being the 71st anniversary of the 1941 Japanese annexation of North East China, Japanese claims for the islands will undoubtedly provoke Chinese outcry as anti-Japanese sentiment run high in China. The outrage runs to such heights that the government in China must use its powers to restrain protesters from becoming too militant. Large segments of Japanese society view the nation's foreign policy as weak and unfit for a nation as large and economically influential as Japan. They see little reason for Japan's rather passive stance in international politics and some even question the point of Japanese pacifism. These people, although nowhere near being the majority of the Japanese population, are still significant enough to warrant political pandering. The development of the Senkaku Islands dispute is indicative of significant issues facing both Chinese and Japanese society. 

Both the claims of China and Japan are dodgy at best and reasonably, no party should be that outraged. The Chinese must look back at least four centuries until they see a point in time when they actually controlled the islands, and even then, the islands were nearly uninhabited and part of a Chinese vassal instead of China proper. The Japanese have only ever obtained the islands as a part of their colonial expansion in the late 19th century – their best claim is still morally unsound.

 Japan keeps reviving the issue of the islands despite the nigh-impossibility of Chinese acquiescence to elicit support by appealing to a public opinion that reflects a disregard for history. Outside post-secondary education, Japanese history lessons generally omit the nation's dark past of mass slaughter and human rights abuse. Naturally without this context, many would believe that land acquired during Japan's colonial era is rightfully theirs. This dispute is only one of the myriad of problems associated with the Japanese government's use of revisionist history. Chinese society has similar problems: Instead of omitting historical details, Chinese education strongly emphasizes its oppressed past. The Chinese Communist Party shifted the basis of their legitimacy from communism to economic progress and nationalism which requires them to frame Chinese history in a manner that perpetuated anti-foreign sentiment. Despite how powerful China is in compared to Japan these nations, much of the Chinese public see all foreign disagreements with China as both bullying and oppressive. This opinion compels the public to demand a hardline stance from the government on issues of territorial sovereignty, though these demands usually remain unmet. 



The islands dispute and others like it will remain unresolved in the foreseeable future. The relevance of these issues stem from revisionist accounts of history which have inflamed nationalism. These diplomatic incidents will remain useful tools for the government to use as distractions. However, it is doubtful that military conflict will arise from the land claims, as China and Japan are too economically interdependent. A conflict with China would cripple Japan economically while Japan's alliance with the United States makes instigating military action a dangerous move for China. Even if the dispute does not result in force of arms, it will continue to plague Sino-Japanese relations and act as a destabilizing factor for the Asia-Pacific region. 

1 Malcolm Moore, “Military Conflict 'looms' between Japan and China,” The Telegraph, September 27th, 2012. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9571032/Military-conflict-looms-between-China-and-Japan.html 

2 “Senkaku Diaoyu Islands,” Global Security, October 24th, 2012. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/senkaku.htm 

3. “The Ryukyu Kingdom and Its Relationship with China and Japan”, Okinawa Peace Network of Los Angeles, October 24th, 2012. http://www.uchinanchu.org/uchinanchu/history_early.htm 




1 comment:

  1. I agree that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute is an excersise in distraction, meant to attract attentions away from domestic issues facing the administrations of each country. However, at least in the case of China, I think that the issues it is looking to obscure are more diverse than simply its impending leadership transition. Afterall, for all the obscurity surrounding the internal workings of the Chinese Communist Party, it is clear that Xi Jinping has long been favoured as Hu Jintao’s successor as General Secretary. For an authoritarian regime, this leadership transition is just about as bureaucratic, orderly, and transparent as they come. Arguably of greater concern for Chinese elite is the wavering growth of its economy, and wavering legitimacy that will occur if its unspoken contract - authoritarian governance in return for economic prosperity - with its people is broken. Coupled with the knowledge of America’s ‘pivot’ towards Asia in terms of its defense and security priorities, and the fact that China is still tremendously weaker militarily than its super power incumbent, the CCP is likely feeling the heat both internally and externally of its borders. The use of nationalistic fervor is not an uncommon tactic used to graft responsibility for a state’s problems onto a scapegoat - a role that it appears Japan has conveniently filled in this case.

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